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A B S T R A C T
Present Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) for MANETs require continuous monitoring which leads to
rapid depletion of a node’s battery life. To address this issue, we propose a new IDS scheme comprising
a novel cluster leader election process and a hybrid IDS. The cluster leader election process uses the Vickrey–
Clarke–Groves mechanism to elect the cluster leader which provides the intrusion detection service. The
hybrid IDS comprises a threshold based lightweight module and a powerful anomaly based heavy-
weight module. Initially, only the lightweight module is activated. The decision to activate the heavyweight
module is taken by modeling the intrusion detection process as an incomplete information non-
cooperative game between the elected leader node and the potential malicious node. Simulation results
show that the proposed scheme signiﬁcantly reduces the IDS traﬃc and overall power consumption in
addition to maintaining a high detection rate and accuracy.
© 2016, Karabuk University. Publishing services by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are a collection of hetero-
geneous, infrastructure less, self organizing and battery powered
mobile nodes with different resources availability and computa-
tional capabilities. The dynamic and distributed nature of MANETs
makes them suitable for deployment in extreme and volatile en-
vironmental conditions. They have found applications in diverse
domains such as military operations, environmental monitoring,
rescue operations etc. Each node in a MANET is equipped with a
wireless transmitter and receiver, which enables it to communi-
cate with other nodes within its wireless transmission range.
However, due to limited wireless communication range and node
mobility, nodes inMANETmust cooperate with each other to provide
networking services among themselves. Therefore, each node in a
MANET acts both as a host and a router.
The dynamic and distributed nature of MANETs make them vul-
nerable to various types of attacks like black hole attack, traﬃc
distortion, IP spooﬁng, DoS attack etc. Malicious nodes can launch
attacks against other normal nodes and deteriorate the overall per-
formance of the entire network [1–3]. Unlike in wired networks,
there are no ﬁxed checkpoints like router and switches in MANETs,
where the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be deployed [4,5].
Therefore, nodes in MANETs must cooperate in many aspects
including intrusion detection for their well being [6–8]. IDSs have
been deployed with great degree of success across diverse domains
likewireless Ad-hoc networks [5,9], MANETs [10–12], wireless sensor
networks [13], cyber-physical system [14], cloud computing [15],
large scale complex critical infrastructures [16] etc. In this paper,
we focus on IDS for MANETs.
Due to absence of any centralized monitoring entity in MANETs,
each node runs its own IDS and usually operates in a promiscuous
mode. However, owing to limited battery life, it is not feasible to
keep the IDS running continuously on MANET nodes. Most of the
current MANET IDS schemes do not take into account the nature
of the environment they are operating in and therefore they end
up monitoring all nodes with equal probability, irrespective of
whether or not the node being monitored has a history proﬁle of
being malicious. This results in a poor monitoring strategy wherein
the node operating the IDS ends upwastingmost of its energymoni-
toring the normal nodes. Another issue with many MANET IDS
schemes [17–19] is that they generate heavy intrusion detection
related traﬃc. Unlike the wired networks, MANETs have limited
bandwidth and therefore, a large amount of intrusion detection
related traﬃc can cause severe congestion in the network and limit
the ﬂow of normal traﬃc. In addition, heavy intrusion detection
traﬃc also leads to more energy consumption amongMANET nodes
for processing them.
Designing a MANET IDS scheme that is energy eﬃcient and gen-
erates a low IDS traﬃc, while at the same time maintaining a high
accuracy and detection rate is an active area of research. In this paper,
we model the intrusion detection process in MANETs using a game
theoretical framework. Game theory basedMANET IDSs [20–22] have
been found to be energy eﬃcient as well as generate low IDS traﬃc
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through application of dynamic and economical monitoring strat-
egies. Game theory based IDS models the intrusion detection
problem as a non-cooperative game between two competing players
(attacker and defender), where the defender player (cluster leader
node) tries to maximize its payoff by increasing its probability of
successful intrusion detection while the attacker player (mali-
cious node) tries to minimize its probability of being detected by
the IDS.
Game theory based IDS scheme allows the IDS to assess the type
of the node beingmonitored and adopt appropriatemonitoring strat-
egies. Nodes are assigned maliciousness values based on the history
proﬁle of their observed actions. Unlike most conventional IDSs that
adopt promiscuousmonitoring strategy and results in high IDS traﬃc
generation, game theory based IDS uses a dynamic monitoring strat-
egy wherein nodes with high maliciousness values are monitored
more frequently compared to nodes with lowmaliciousness values.
This helps the IDS to conserve its energy and minimize the overall
IDS traﬃc generation. In a game theoretic IDS framework, a rigor-
ous monitoring strategy is adopted by the IDS if the environment
it is operating in is hostile. On the other hand, if the environment
is less hostile, a less rigorous monitoring strategy is adopted by the
IDS.
Most of the game theory based IDSs proposed in the literature
[19–21,23] assume a complete information game, wherein all players
(nodes) have complete information about the game, i.e., they make
an implicit assumption that various network parameters like energy
levels and types of network nodes (normal or malicious), accura-
cy and detection rate of IDS etc. are known to all nodes a priori. But,
such assumptions have limitations, since in most of the real network
settings each node only has a limited information about the network
parameters. Therefore, to address this issue of incomplete infor-
mation game, we propose a Bayesian game theory based MANET
IDS scheme that models the interaction between the attacker (ma-
licious node) and the defender (node operating IDS) in MANET as
a two person multi-stage, non-cooperative and incomplete infor-
mation game. The Bayesian model [19] allows the node operating
the IDS to adopt the most eﬃcient monitoring strategy in an in-
complete information game settings by examining themaliciousness
history proﬁle of the node being monitored and by evaluating the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.
In summary, this paper proposes a MANET IDS scheme with the
following objectives:
1. Modeling the intrusion detection process in MANETs as an in-
complete information Bayesian game as nodes in MANETs only
have partial information about the network.
2. Minimization of power consumption for operating IDS inMANETs.
3. Minimization of intrusion detection related traﬃc in MANETs.
4. Developing a MANET IDS scheme with high accuracy and de-
tection rate.
To achieve these objectives, we propose a new MANET IDS
scheme consisting of the following two components:
1. A MANET leader election mechanism: This component elects the
cluster leader node using the VCG mechanism [24] and en-
trusts it with the responsibility of providing intrusion detection
services to all other cluster nodes for a predeﬁned period of time.
Cluster leader elections are held at regular intervals which ensures
uniform energy consumption among various cluster nodes for
operating the IDS.
2. A hybrid MANET IDS: This component comprises one light-
weight module and one heavyweight module. The lightweight
module is less powerful but requires less energy for its opera-
tion. On the other hand, the heavyweight module is more
powerful than the lightweight module but requires more energy
for its operation. Initially only the lightweight module is acti-
vated. If the action of the node being monitored by the
lightweightmodule is determined to bemalicious then the heavy-
weight module is activated, else the decision to activate the
heavyweight module is determined by the Nash Equilibrium of
the non-cooperative game played between the elected leader
node and the node being monitored.
The elected leader node operates the hybrid MANET IDS. Initial-
ly, only the lightweight module of the hybridMANET IDS is activated,
which calculates the Packet Forwarding Rate (PFR) of the poten-
tial malicious node being monitored. The PFR of any given node is
deﬁned as the ratio of total number of packets received to the total
number of packets forwarded by the node over a given period of
time. If the PFR of the node being monitored is less than the thresh-
old value, then its action is assumed to be malicious and the
heavyweightmodule is activated formore rigorous analysis. However,
if the action of the node is found to be normal then the decision
to activate the heavyweight module is determined by modeling the
intrusion detection process as a multi-stage Bayesian game between
two competing players, where the players of the game are the cluster
leader node and the potential malicious node.
The cluster leader node has incomplete information about the
type of the opponent node (normal or malicious) and the follow-
ing two strategies: Monitor and Not Monitor. Here, the strategy
Monitor corresponds to the activation of the heavyweight module.
Similarly, the attacker player has two strategies: Attack andNot Attack.
The Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game is the strategy
pair of the players which corresponds to the probability of the leader
node to play its strategy Monitor/Not Monitor and the probability
of the attacker player to play its strategy Attack/Not Attack. Intru-
sion detection process in MANETs is usually an incomplete
information game, where nodes only have partial information about
network parameters. The Bayesian game model allows the cluster
leader node to formulate its monitoring strategies based on its belief
about the type of the node (malicious or normal) being moni-
tored without requiring a complete information about that node.
It also minimizes the overall IDS traﬃc by adopting a non-
promiscuous monitoring strategy.
Simulation results in NS-2 [25] show that the proposed MANET
IDS scheme signiﬁcantly reduces the power consumption for op-
erating the IDS among MANET nodes by 15–20% compared to a
randommodel. Further, the proposed scheme also maintains a high
level of detection rate against route compromise, traﬃc distortion and
black-hole attacks without introducing any signiﬁcant traﬃc.
The rest of the paper has been structured in the following way.
Section 2 discusses about the background and related works on in-
trusion detection in MANETs. Section 3 presents the overall
description of our proposed MANET IDS scheme. Bayesian Game
model used for developing energy eﬃcient IDS monitoring strate-
gies is discussed in section 3.1. A distributed and energy eﬃcient
MANET leader election mechanism is discussed in section 3.2. A
hybrid MANET IDS along with its main components are discussed
in section 3.3. Experimental results and performance evaluation of
the proposed hybrid MANET IDS and MANET leader election mech-
anism are provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides the
conclusion and future work.
2. Background and related works
In this section, we provide a brief background study on differ-
ent types of MANET IDS based on their detection mechanism and
modes of operation. We then discuss about various intrusion de-
tection issues in MANETs and analyze the related works which have
been categorized into non-game theory based and game theory
based. Finally, the drawbacks associated with the related works have
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been listed out which provides us with the motivation for our work
to address them.
Based on their mode of operations, IDS in MANETs can broadly
be classiﬁed into anomaly based, signature based and speciﬁca-
tion based. The anomaly based IDSs consist of the training phase
and the testing phase. The normal traﬃc proﬁle of the network is
developed during the training phase and then the learned model
is used to analyze the current network traﬃc for sign of misbehav-
ior during the testing phase. Numerous anomaly detection methods
like statistical methods [26,27], data-mining methods [28] and
machine learning based methods [29] have been developed. The
main advantage of anomaly-based IDSs are their ability to detect
previous unknown attacks not seen during the training phase.
However, the main drawback of anomaly based IDSs is their high
False Positive (FP) alarm rate. Signature-based IDSs [30] use a da-
tabase of known attack signatures and raise an alarmwherever there
is a malicious traﬃc that matches with one or more attack signa-
tures in the database. They have high detection rate against known
attacks but cannot detect new attacks. They require frequent updates
to their signature database to detect new attacks. The speciﬁcation-
based IDSs [31] specify a set of constraints on the network traﬃc
or protocols and any violations of these speciﬁcations are treated
as intrusions. They provide detection against both known and
unknown attacks with low false positive rate. However, the main
drawback of speciﬁcation-based IDSs is their requirement of de-
tailed speciﬁcations for each program/protocol, which is a very time
consuming and computationally expensive process.
Based on their modes of operations, IDSs in MANETs can be
grouped into Stand-alone IDS, Distributed IDS and Clustered IDS. In
the Stand-alone IDS architecture, each node independently runs its
own IDS to determine intrusions. There is no cooperation between
the nodes in the network and every intrusion decision made by the
node is solely based on its own gathered information. Since partial
information on each individual node might not be enough to detect
attacks like network scans, this category of IDS is not suitable and
generally not preferred for MANETs. In the Distributed IDS archi-
tecture, every node participates in the intrusion detection process
by having an IDS agent running on them. The IDS agent collects local
event data to detect and identify local network intrusions. However,
neighboring IDS agents cooperate to perform a global intrusion de-
tection, when the local intrusion detection evidence is inconclusive.
In the Clustered IDS architecture, the network is divided into mul-
tiple clusters. Every cluster node runs its own IDS agent, which
monitors and detects local intrusions for the given cluster node, while
the cluster head runs the IDS agent both locally for its own node
and globally for the entire set of cluster nodes.
The conventional IDSs used in wired networks are ineffective and
ineﬃcient for MANETs because of differences in their underlying
characteristics and architectures. Themajor issues encounteredwhile
developing an IDS for MANETs are:
• Lack of Central Monitoring Points: Unlike in wired networks there
are no centralized points like routers and gateways for moni-
toring network traﬃc in MANETs. IDS in MANETs needs to be
distributed and cooperative. However, limited bandwidth, low
energy levels, different computation capabilities of MANET nodes,
presence of malicious nodes etc. put a serious constraint on co-
operation among MANET nodes.
• Mobility: MANET topology may change frequently because of
mobile nodes that can exit or join the network arbitrarily. This
makes it diﬃcult for the IDS to differentiate whether the node
sending an out of date routing information is simply out of syn-
chronization with other MANET nodes or whether the node has
been compromised.
• Wireless Links: Wireless networks have limited bandwidth com-
pared to wired networks. Heavy intrusion detection related traﬃc
could cause network congestion and limit the ﬂow of normal
traﬃc. Therefore, MANET IDSs need to minimize their data ﬂow
to avoid network congestion. But constraining the IDS traﬃc ﬂow
may result in performance degradation of the IDSs and they may
not be able to respond to intrusions in real time.
• Limited Resources: Mobile nodes in MANETs consist of various
mobile devices with different computational capabilities and
energy resources. Therefore, signature-based IDS for MANETs
must take into account memory constraints for storing attack
signatures, while the anomaly-basedMANET IDS needs to be op-
timized to reduce energy usage for correlation of the network
traﬃc with the learned IDS model.
• Insecure Communication Link: MANETs are vulnerable to various
passive attacks like eavesdropping and interference. Therefore,
IDS traﬃc needs to be encrypted to prevent the attacker from
learning about the working principles of the IDS. However, em-
ploying cryptographic and authenticationmechanism inMANETs
is not feasible as they consume signiﬁcant amount of energy and
are computationally expensive.
2.1. Related works
Shakshuki et al. [18] proposed an IDS named Enhanced Adap-
tive Acknowledgment (EAACK) for MANETs. Their scheme requires
all acknowledgment packets to be digitally signed by its sender and
veriﬁed by its receiver. They used DSA and RSA as digital signa-
tures and showed that their scheme is able to detect wide range
of attacks. However, the drawback of their scheme is the require-
ment to digitally sign all the acknowledgments which increases
computational overhead.
Marti et al. [32] proposed an IDS scheme for MANET which con-
sists of two different modules, viz. the Watchdog and the Pathrater.
In this scheme, the Watchdog acts as an IDS for the MANET and
detects malicious node behaviors in the network by promiscu-
ously listening to its next hop’s transmission. If theWatchdog notices
that its immediate next node fails to forward the packet within a
given period of time then it increments the node’s failure counter.
If the failure counter of themonitored node exceeds a threshold value
then the Watchdog reports the node as misbehaving. The Pathrater
is then employed to inform the routing protocol to avoid the re-
ported nodes for further data transmission. The drawback of this
scheme is that it requires continuous monitoring by the Watch-
dog for detecting intrusions.
Lui et al. [17] proposed a TWOACK MANET IDS scheme which
requires every data packets transmitted over three consecutive nodes
along the source to the destination path to be acknowledged. Every
node along the route has to send back an acknowledgment packet
to the node that is two hop counts away from it in the route. The
arrival of TWOACK packet at ﬁrst node X (in the three consecutive
nodes along the route) indicates a successful transmission of packet
from node X to node Z via the intermediate node Y. However, if this
TWOACK packet is not received within a given predeﬁned time in-
terval, both nodes Y and Z are reported as malicious. The drawback
of this scheme is that it introduces a routing overhead due to fre-
quent TWOACK packet generation.
Misra et al. [33] proposed a distributed self-learning, energy-
aware and low complexity protocol for intrusion detection inwireless
sensor network. Their protocol uses the stochastic Learning Au-
tomata (LA) on packet sampling mechanism to obtain an energy
eﬃcient IDS. They showed that their approach was successful in de-
tecting and removingmalicious packets from theWSN. The drawback
of this scheme is that the LA needsmultiple rounds of learning before
it becomes eﬃcient. Haddadi and Sarram [34] proposed a hybrid
IDS model for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) that uses both
misuse and anomaly based IDS sub-modules to detect intrusion. The
drawback of this approach is that the response times of the misuse
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based and anomaly based IDSs are different. It also introduces sig-
niﬁcant computational overhead due to processing of the same data
traﬃc by two different IDSs.
A light weight, energy eﬃcient and non-cryptographic intru-
sion detection solution against the gray hole attack in MANET is
proposed in Reference [35] by Mohanapriya and Krishnamurthi.
However, their scheme requires the IDS to operate in a promiscu-
ous mode to detect intrusions, which results in high power
consumption for operating the IDS.
A game-theoretic solution for Ad-hoc networks that models the
cooperation and selﬁshness of the networks are discussed in Ref-
erences [36,37]. In these schemes, each node decides whether to
forward or not forward a packet based on the trade-offs involved
in cost (energy consumption) and beneﬁts (network throughput)
involved in collaborating with other nodes in the network. There-
fore, enforcing a cooperation mechanism ensures that a selﬁsh node
that does not obey the network rules receives a low throughput.
The drawback of this scheme is that it assumes the complete in-
formation game, where nodes have full knowledge about the
network parameters.
Lui et al. [19] proposed a game theoretic framework to analyze
the interactions between pairs of attacking/defending nodes using
a Bayesian formulation in wireless Ad-hoc Networks. They sug-
gested a Bayesian hybrid detection approach for the defender, in
which a less powerful lightweight module is used to estimate the
opponent’s type, and a more powerful heavyweight module acts as
a last line of defense. They analyzed the obtainable Nash Equilib-
rium (NE) for the attacker/defender Bayesian game in both static
and dynamic settings and concluded that the dynamic approach is
a more realistic model, since it allows the defender to consistently
update its belief about the maliciousness of the opponent player
as the game evolves. The drawback of their work is that it is diﬃ-
cult to determine a reasonable prior probability about the
maliciousness of the attacker player.
Liu [38] proposed a general incentive-based method to model
attacker’s intent, objectives and strategies (AIOS) based on game the-
oretic formalization. The author developed an incentive-based
conceptual framework for AIOS modeling which can capture the in-
herent inter-dependency between AIOS and defender objectives and
strategies in such a way that AIOS can be automatically inferred.
The AIOS modeling enables the defender to predict which kind of
strategies are more likely to be taken by the attacker than the others,
even before such an attack happens. The AIOS inferences lead tomore
precise risk assessment and harm prediction. The drawback of the
scheme is that it assumes the complete information game.
Chen et al. [39] proposed a framework that applies two game the-
oretic schemes for economic deployment of intrusion detection agent.
In the ﬁrst scheme, the interaction between an attacker and the in-
trusion detection agent is modeled and analyzed within a non-
cooperative game theory setting. Themixed strategy Nash Equilibrium
solution is then used to derive the security risk value. The second
scheme uses the security risk value derived by the ﬁrst scheme to
compute the Shapley value of the intrusion detection agentwhile con-
sidering the various threat levels. This allows the network
administrator to quantitatively evaluate the security risk of each IDS
agent and easily select the most critical and effective IDS agent de-
ployment to meet the various threat levels to the network. The
drawback of this scheme is the computational overhead involved for
calculating the Shapley values of the intrusion detection agents.
A game theoretical framework to model the interaction between
the service provider and the attacker as an intrusion detection game
was proposed by Kodialam and Lakshman [23]. In this scheme, the
game is represented as a two person zero-sum game, wherein the
service provider tries to maximize its payoff by increasing its prob-
ability of successful detection while the attacker tries to minimize
its probability of being detected by the IDS. The optimal solution
for both players is to play the minmax strategy of the game. The
drawback of this model is the assumption that both players (at-
tacker and defender) have complete information about the topology
of the network and all links in the network, which allows the players
to choose the optimal path for playing theminmax strategy. However,
this assumption is usually invalid in real networks where the players
have an incomplete information about the network parameters.
Agah et al. [20] and Alpcan and Basar [21] addressed the attack–
defense problem in a sensor network as a two-player non-
cooperative, non-zero-sum game. In their model, the game is
assumed to have a complete information and the payoff function
of the opponent player decides each player’s optimal strategy. The
drawback of their work is the assumption that the players have com-
plete information about the game.
In summary, we found that most of the non-game theory based
IDS schemes proposed in the literature are computationally expen-
sive and require continuous monitoring, thereby leading to more
power consumption for operating the IDS. The game theory based
IDSs proposed in the literature addresses this issue to some extent.
However, most of the previous works on game theory basedMANET
IDS assumes a complete information game where both players (at-
tacker and defender) have complete information about the game.
But such an assumption is usually not valid in a real network, where
each node only has a partial information about the network because
all network parameters are not known a priori. We also found that
most of the games are static in nature where the strategies and utili-
ties of players are ﬁxed and repeated over a period of time. This
approach fails in a dynamic environment where players adopt dif-
ferent strategies at various stages of the game. We also found that
most of IDSs proposed in literature for MANETs are speciﬁc to certain
classes of attacks like blackhole attack, wormhole attack etc. [32,40].
All these drawbacks in the related works provide us with the mo-
tivation to propose a newMANET IDS scheme based on incomplete
information game to address them.
In this paper, we propose a new IDS scheme for MANETs com-
prising of two different components viz. the MANET leader election
mechanism and the hybridMANET IDS. The former componentmini-
mizes the overall power consumption required for operating the IDS
by distributing the task of intrusion detection among various cluster
nodes. It elects the cluster leader node based on reputations and
energy levels of nodes. The elected leader node is designated with
the responsibility of providing intrusion detection services to all other
cluster nodes for a predeﬁned period of time.
The second component of the proposed IDS scheme is a game
theory based hybrid MANET IDS, which performs the actual intru-
sion detection operation. The leader node elected by the election
mechanism runs the hybridMANET IDS. The hybridMANET IDS com-
prises one lightweight module and one heavyweight module. The
lightweight module is less powerful and uses simple analytical rules
based on threshold values to detect intrusions. On the other hand,
the heavyweight module is more powerful and uses complex
association-mining rule techniques to detect anomalies. Initially, only
the lightweight module is activated. The decision to activate the
heavyweight module depends on the output of the lightweight
module. If an intrusion is detected by the lightweight module, then
it activates the heavyweight module for more rigorous analysis.
However, if no malicious activity is detected by the lightweight
module, then the network intrusion detection problem is modeled
as a non-cooperative game between the elected leader node and
the potential malicious node. In this case, the BNE of the game
decides the probability of activating the heavyweight IDS module.
3. Proposed MANET IDS scheme
In this section, we describe various assumptions and aspects
of our proposed MANET IDS scheme. First, the ﬂowchart of the
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proposed scheme is provided and then its components viz. the
MANET cluster leader election mechanism and the hybrid MANET IDS
are described. The hybrid MANET IDS comprises a lightweight IDS
and a heavyweight IDS module. We make the following assump-
tions related to our proposed MANET IDS scheme:
• MANET is divided into a set of clusters using a standard cluster
algorithm [41]. Every node in a given cluster is within the trans-
mission range of each other.
• Each node ni in a given MANET cluster has the following asso-
ciated parameters: maliciousness value (pi), reputation value (Ri)
and energy value (Ei).
• The elected cluster node (CL) provides the intrusion detection ser-
vices to all other cluster nodes for a predeﬁned period of time
by operating the IDS.
Fig. 1 shows the ﬂowchart of our proposed MANET IDS scheme.
Initially, the cluster leader node CL is elected using the VCG mech-
anism [24]. CL is entrusted with the responsibility of providing
intrusion detection services to the entire set of cluster nodes for a
predeﬁned period. The intrusion detection service provided by CL
to any given cluster node nj depends on nj’s reputation value (Rj).
Nodes with higher reputations are entitled to more service from CL
compared to nodes with lower reputations. The services provided
by CL to node nj includes monitoring the incoming traﬃc received
by nj from its neighbors as well as monitoring the outgoing traﬃc
of nj. CL may misbehave after being elected as a leader node by not
providing intrusion detection services to other cluster nodes or by
reporting the normal node as malicious. Therefore, a set of checker
nodes are elected to monitor the operations of CL. If CL is found to
be misbehaving by the checker nodes, then it is punished by low-
ering its reputation value. The detailed description of the MANET
leader election and punishment mechanism is provided in section
3.2.
After being elected as the cluster leader, CL assigns initial ma-
liciousness belief value (pi) to cluster node ni being monitored and
activates its lightweight IDS module to determine the action of ni.
The lightweight IDS module uses the packet forwarding rate (PFR)
of ni as a parameter to determine the action of ni as Attack or Normal.
The PFR of ni is deﬁned as the ratio of total number of packets re-
ceived by ni to the total number of packets forwarded by ni over a
given interval of time. If the PFR of ni is less than the threshold value
TPFR , then the action of ni is assumed to be Attack. The pi value of
ni is then updated using the Bayes rule, and the heavyweight IDS
module of CL is activated for more rigorous analysis. However, if the
PFR of ni is greater than or equal to the threshold value TPFR , then
the action of ni is assumed to be Normal. In this case too, the pi value
of ni is updated using the Bayes rule but the decision to activate the
heavyweight IDS module is determined by representing the inter-
action between CL and ni as a non-cooperative game between two
competing players and calculating the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE) of the game. The BNE of this game corresponds to the strat-
egy combination (q*, p*), where q* is the probability of CL to activate
its heavyweight IDS module and p* is the probability of ni to play
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the proposed MANET IDS scheme.
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its strategy Attack. Any unilateral deviation by either players (CL or
ni) from the BNE strategy reduces the payoff (increase in monitor-
ing cost for CL or increased probability of getting caught for ni) of
the deviating player. Therefore, in this case, the decision to acti-
vate the heavyweight IDS is probabilistic and depends on the BNE
of the game. The probabilistic activation of the heavyweight IDS
module is achieved by using a random number generator that gen-
erates a random number between 0 and 1. If the generated number
is greater than or equal to the value of q* then the heavyweight IDS
module is activated; otherwise, it is not activated. The heavy-
weight module is an anomaly based IDS that uses association-rule
mining technique to determine the action of ni as attack or normal.
If the action of ni is found to be normal by the heavyweight module
then the pi value of ni is reset to pi/2; otherwise, the pi value of ni
is retained.
The basic philosophy of the proposed hybrid IDS scheme is that,
data packets in MANETs can be dropped due to various reasons like
network congestion, depletion of node’s resources, presence of ma-
licious nodes etc. Nevertheless, excessive packet dropping is a strong
indication of presence of malicious node in the network. There-
fore, the calculation of node ni’s PFR value by the lightweight IDS
module provides a strong insight into ni being malicious or not. So,
if a node ni is ascertained to bemalicious by the lightweight module,
executing the heavyweight module is justiﬁed. However, a node can
be malicious but still maintain its PDR above the threshold value
by carrying out sniﬃng and probe types of attacks. Therefore, proba-
bilistic activation of the heavyweight IDS module ensures the
monitoring of such malicious nodes. Since the energy required for
operating the heavyweight IDSmodule is comparatively higher than
that required for operating the lightweight IDS module, using the
lightweight IDS module as a precursor before activating the heavy-
weight IDSmodule reduces the overall power consumption required
for operating the IDS. More elaborate details about the proposed
hybrid MANET IDS is provided in section 3.3.
In the next section, we introduce the preliminaries of the game
theory which is a prerequisite for developing monitoring strate-
gies of the proposed hybrid MANET IDS.
3.1. Bayesian game model for proposed MANET IDS
Game theory allows us to study events of conﬂict and cooper-
ation between two or more rational decision makers (players) with
different set of objectives and competing for the same set of re-
sources. Therefore, game theory is concerned with ﬁnding the best
actions for individual decision makers in such situations and rec-
ognizing stable outcomes.
The interaction between the monitoring node and the poten-
tial malicious node in a MANET can be represented as a two player
static Bayesian game in which one of the player Pi is a potential at-
tacker and the other player Pj is a defender. The private information
of player Pi is its type θi (normal or malicious). The type θi = 1 if the
player Pi is normal and θi = 0 if it is malicious. This private infor-
mation regarding the type of player Pi is unknown to the defender
player Pj. The type of the defender player is always normal and
denoted by θj = 1, which is a common knowledge known to both the
players. The attacker player of type θi = 0 has two pure strategies:
{Attack, Not attack} while the normal player of type θi = 1 has only
one pure strategy: {Not attack}. Similarly, the defender player Pj has
two pure strategies: {Monitor, Not monitor}.
Both the players simultaneously choose their strategies at the
beginning of the game with prior knowledge about the costs in-
volved in monitoring and attacking any given node in the network
along with the beliefs about the types of their opponents. This non-
cooperative incomplete information game between the two players
Pi and Pj can be represented as a triplet G N S U= , , , where
• N = {Pi, Pj} are the two players of the game.
• S = Si × Sj is the strategy space of the game with Si and Sj being
the strategy space of players Pi and Pj, respectively.
• U = Ui × Uj is the payoff utility corresponding to the strategy space
S. Ui and Uj are the payoffs of players Pi and Pj corresponding to
their strategy spaces Si and Sj, respectively.
In the subsequent sections, the terms player and node refer to
the same entity and we use them interchangeably. Let C = {n1, n2, . . .,
nt} be a set of t nodes in a given MANET cluster. Consider any given
node nk ∈ C, where k (1 ≤ k ≤ t) is the index of nk and the asset value
of nk is wk. Therefore, the symbol k in nk refers to the index number
of the kth node in the given cluster and wk refers to the associated
asset value of the node nk. The loss of asset when the attacker player
Pi successfully exploits the node nk represents a loss, whose value
is equivalent to degree of damage such as loss of reputation, com-
promise of data integrity, cost of controlling damages etc. The
defender player Pj is the cluster leader node. Pj is equipped with an
IDS and is entrusted with the responsibility of providing intrusion
detecting services to all other cluster nodes. Let the detection rate
and the false alarm rate (FP rate) of Pj’s IDS be denoted by α and γ,
respectively where α, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Let the cost involved in attacking
the node nk by Pi be denoted by Cak and the cost involved in moni-
toring the node nk by Pj be denoted by Cmk .
Tables 1 and 2 show the payoff matrices corresponding to the
interaction between players Pi and Pj over the node nk whose asset
value is worth wk, when the type of Pi is malicious and normal, re-
spectively. These tables deﬁne various payoffs obtained by the
defender and the attacker/normal players when interacting over a
node nk. The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 1, when
the type of player Pi is malicious.
• When the malicious player Pi attacks and the defender player
Pj monitors, i.e., for strategy combination S1 = (Attack, Not Monitor),
the defender player Pj gets a payoff
U S wj k1( ) = −
which represents the loss of asset worth wk. On the other hand,
for this strategy, the malicious player Pi receives a payoff which
is its gain from the successful exploitation of node nk minus the
cost involved in attacking the node nk (Cak ). Therefore, the payoff
utility of player Pi with strategy S1 is
U S w Ci k ak1( ) = −
• For strategy combination S2 = (Attack, Monitor), the defender player
Pj’s payoff is the gain from successful attack detection against node
nk minus the monitoring cost Cmk . However, successful attack de-
tection against node nk depends on the detection rate (α) of the
IDS monitoring the node nk. Therefore, the payoff utility of de-
fender player Pj playing strategy S2 is
Table 1
Payoff matrix when player Pi is malicious.
Monitor Not Monitor
Attack 1 2− −( )α w Ck ak , 2 1α − −( )w Ck mk w Ck ak− , −wk
Not Attack 0, − −γw Ck mk 0, 0
Table 2
Payoff matrix when player Pi is normal.
Monitor Not Monitor
Not Attack 0, − −γw Ck mk 0, 0
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where (1 − α) represents the false negative rate of the IDS. On
the other hand, the malicious player Pi’s loss after being caught
is equal to player Pj’s gain minus the attacking cost Cak . There-
fore, player Pi’s payoff utility with strategy S2 is
U S w Ci k ak2 1 2( ) = −( ) −α
• For the strategy S3 = (Not Attack, Monitor), the defender Pj’s ex-
pected loss is −γwk due to false alarm of IDS plus the monitoring
cost Cmk , while the payoff of malicious player Pi is 0. Therefore,
the payoff utilities of players Pj and Pi with strategy S3 are






( ) = − −
( ) =
γ
• For the strategy S4 = (Not Attack, Not Monitor) the payoffs of both
the players are 0, i.e., Uj(S4) = Ui(S4) = 0.
Similarly from Table 2, we observe that when the type of player
Pi is normal, the payoff of player Pi is always 0. The payoff of de-
fender player Pj is 0 if it plays its pure strategy (Not Monitor). On
the other hand, if it plays its pure strategy (Monitor) its payoff utility
is − −γw Ck mk , which is the cost incurred due to false IDS alarms and
the monitoring cost.
3.1.1. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) analysis
Fig. 2 shows the extensive form of the Bayesian Game de-
scribed in the preceding section. This game is also an imperfect
information game since the defender player Pj is not aware about
the type (Normal, Malicious) and action (Attack, Not Attack) of the
player Pi while choosing its own action (Monitor, Not Monitor). In
Fig. 2, N is the nature node that determines the type of player Pi.
Let po be the prior probability of player Pi being malicious. Wemake
an implicit assumption that both players are rational and their main
objective is to maximize their respective payoffs. The attacker would
want to play a strategy that minimizes its probability of being de-
tected by the IDS while the defender would like to play a strategy
that maximizes its probability of successfully detecting the
attack.
In the subsequent section, we analyze the BNE of the game as-
suming that player Pj’s prior belief (po) about player Pi beingmalicious
is a common prior, i.e., player Pi (attacker) knows player Pj’s (de-
fender) belief about player Pi beingmalicious.Wemake the following
observations about the Bayesian game described by Tables 1 and
2 and Fig. 2.
• If the type of player Pi is malicious and if it plays its pure strat-
egy Attack then the expected payoff of player Pj playing its pure
strategy Monitor is:
U Monitor p w C p w Cj o k m o k mk k( ) = −( ) −( ) − −( ) +( )2 1 1α γ
andwhen it plays its pure strategyNot Monitor, its expected payoff
is:
U Not Monitor p wj o k( ) = −
• When the defender player Pj plays its pure strategy Monitor, the
expected payoffs of malicious player Pi playing its pure strate-
gies Attack and Not Attack are:
U Attack p w C and
U Not Attack respectively
i o k a
i










α γ2 , the
best response of the player Pj is to play its pure strategy Monitor.
However, when player Pj plays its pure strategyMonitor, the best
response of player Pi would be to play its pure strategy Not Attack.
Hence the strategy ((Attack if malicious, Not Attack if normal),









α γ2 . Similarly, if









α γ2 , the best re-
sponse of player Pj is to play Not Monitor, since in this case the
payoff obtained by playing strategyMonitor is less than the payoff
obtained by playing strategy Not Monitor. Therefore, ((Attack if
Fig. 2. Extensive form of the Bayesian game.
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malicious, Not Attack if normal), Not Monitor, po) is a pure strat-










• If the player Pi plays its pure strategy Not Attack, then the player
Pj’s dominant strategy is to play Not Monitor regardless of the
value of po. However, if the player Pj plays Not Monitor, the best
response of player Pi if its type ismalicious is to play Attack. There-
fore, the strategy ((Not Attack if malicious, Not Attack if normal),
Not Monitor) is not a BNE.










α γ2 , then there does not exist any pure-strategy BNE. But
any game with a ﬁnite set of players and ﬁnite set of strategies has
a Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies. Therefore, in such case where
no pure strategy BNE exists, we derive a mixed strategy BNE for the
game.
Let the player Pi play its strategy Attack with probability p if its
type is malicious and play its pure strategy Not Attack if its type is
Normal. In this case, the expected payoff of the defender player Pj
playing its pure strategy Monitor is:
U Monitor pp w C p p w C
p w C
j o k m o k m
o k
k k( ) = −( ) −( ) − −( ) +( )





and the expected payoff of the defender player Pj playing its pure
strategy Not Monitor is:
U Not Monitor pp wj o k( ) = −
Similarly, the expected payoffs of attacker player Pi playing its
pure strategies Attack and Not Attack when the defender player Pj
plays its strategy Monitor with probability q and Not Monitor with
probability (1 − q) are:
U Attack p q w C q w C and
U Not Attack
i o k a k a
i
k k( ) = −( ) −( ) + −( ) −( )( )1 2 1α
( ) = 0, .respectively










which is the equilibrium strategy probability of malicious player
Pi to play its pure strategy Attack. Similarly, by equating
Ui(Attack) = Ui(Not Attack), the player Pj’s equilibrium strategy prob-





2α . Therefore, when the prior









α γ2 , no pure strat-
egy BNE exists. But there exists a mixed-strategy BNE which
corresponds to the strategy pair ((Attack with probability p if ma-
licious, Not Attack if normal), Monitor with probability q, po), where















From the BNE strategy obtained above, we observe that themoni-
toring probability (q) of the defender does not depend on the current
maliciousness belief of the opponent (attacker) player, but rather
inﬂuences the attacker’s behavior, as the probability of attack (p)
is inversely proportional to the defender’s maliciousness belief about
the attacker player. A high maliciousness belief of the defender on
its opponent results in the attacker drastically reducing its attack.
This is a result of the fact that both the attacker and the defender
are rational players and the cost and maliciousness beliefs are
common knowledge known to both players.
The static Bayesian game approach described above can be used
tomodelmost types of attacks inMANETs like Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks, network routing protocol disruption attacks like blackhole
attack [42] and wormhole attack [43] etc. The proposed Bayesian
gamemodel enables the defender to implement its monitoring strat-
egy based on its BNE solution that maximizes its expected payoff
without requiring the IDS to be running all the time. However, the
drawback of the scheme is that it is not always easy to determine
the prior malicious belief (po) about the type of the opponent player
in dynamic and distributed networks. Therefore, depending on the
nature of the environment it is operating in, the defender may assign
an appropriate value for po. If the environment is hostile, a high value
of po should be assigned.
3.2. Energy eﬃcient MANET IDS leader election mechanism
MANET nodes are essentially selﬁsh in nature to preserve their
energies. Taking this fact into account, Mohammed et al. [44] pro-
posed a secure leader election mechanism for MANET. They simply
treated IDS as a service and developed a computational cost metric
for electing the leader node without considering metrics such as
detection rate and false positive rate. In this section, we build on
their work and develop a secure MANET leader election mecha-
nism. We then integrate this mechanism with the dynamic hybrid
IDS model proposed in section 3.3 and eventually evaluate the per-
formance of the overall IDS scheme.
Wemodel MANET as a set of clusters. Nodes in each cluster elect
a leader node which carry out intrusion detection services for the
entire set of cluster nodes for a predeﬁned period of time (one slot
period). Re-election is conducted to elect a new leader node after
the timer expires. In most conventional schemes, the IDS operates
in a promiscuous mode in all cluster nodes with a predeﬁned sam-
pling rate. This can have an adverse impact on the overall lifetime
of the network as most of the node’s energy is consumed for op-
erating the IDS irrespective of whether intrusions take place or not.
Contrary to this, in our proposed scheme, only the elected leader
node operates the IDS and provides intrusion detection services to
all other cluster nodes. This ensures that the power consumption
required for operating the IDS in each individual cluster node is mini-
mized through distribution of intrusion detection task among various
MANET nodes.
The mechanism that elects a random node as a cluster leader
[22] without considering energy level of nodes causes faster death
of nodes with low energy levels. Therefore, the election mecha-
nism must take into consideration the energy level of nodes while
electing the leader node. Moreover, there are some selﬁsh nodes
in the cluster that are unwilling to participate in the intrusion de-
tection process to preserve their resources (CPU time, energy etc).
To address these issues, we propose a reputation based leader node
election mechanism to encourage all cluster nodes including the
selﬁsh ones to participate in the leader node election process by
truthfully revealing their energy levels. The elected leader node is
provided with a payment in the form of reputation gain. Nodes with
higher reputations are considered as more trusted nodes and given
higher priorities in the cluster’s services.
The sampling budget allotted by the leader node to any given
node in the cluster is proportional to its reputation. The sampling
budget ( SBni ) of the i
th node (ni) in the cluster denotes the amount
of service it is entitled to receive from the leader node at the current
game stage and is given as:
SB R Rn i j
j
N




where N is the total number of nodes in the cluster under consid-
eration and Ri is the reputation value of node ni.
Every time a given node is elected as a leader its reputation value
increases. This motivates the cluster nodes to truthfully reveal their
private information (energy levels) during the leader-node elec-
tion process. A default reputation value of Ro is assigned to all nodes
during the cluster formation period, which gets updated when the
node is elected as a cluster leader.
Let the energy required by the cluster leader node to operate
the IDS for the elected period of time be denoted by Eids and its
cost for intrusion detection analysis during this period be denoted
by Csti. We divide the N nodes in the cluster into k energy classes
{Class1, Class2, . . ., Classk} based on their power factor denoted by
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PFi = Ei/NTi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ei is the energy level of node ni and Ti is





























where ρ = {ρ1, ρ2, . . ., ρk−1} is a set of (k − 1) threshold values. The
cost analysis value of node ni ∈ Classi for analyzing data packets for
















































where λ ∈ [0,1] is the sampling budget weighing factor. If the energy
level of any node nj is less than the threshold energy required for
carrying out intrusion detection analysis i.e., if E En idsj < , then node
nj cannot be elected as a cluster leader since its cost of analysis would
be inﬁnite.
To motivate all nodes in the cluster including the selﬁsh ones
for cooperation, we model the leader node election problem as a
game with mobile nodes as its players. Each node ni holds a con-
ﬁdential information θi about its type. The type of θi can be either
Normal or Selﬁsh. The payoff utility function of player (node) ni is
given by:
U P W Oi i i i i i i iθ θ θ θ θ, , ,− −( ) = − ( )( ) (1)
where
• θ−i represents the types of all other cluster nodes except node
ni
• O(θi, θ−i ) = O(θ1,. . .,θi,. . .,θN) is the output corresponding to the
types chosen by the players of the game.
• Wi is the cost of analysis (Csti) incurred by node ni for provid-
ing intrusion detection services. However, if ni is not elected as
a leader, then Wi is 0 since no cost will be incurred to run the
IDS.
• Pi ∈R is the payment provided in the form of reputation to the
elected leader node.
Each node ni seeks to maximize its utility Ui. It signiﬁes the
amount of gain obtained by the player ni if it follows the type θi.
Player ni might deviate from revealing its true cost analysis value
Csti by either under-valuing or exaggerating its Csti value if doing
so leads to better payoff. Therefore, we need to develop a mecha-
nism with truth-telling as its dominant strategy.
The game begins with every node selecting its type θi and evalu-
ating its cost of analysis value Wi. The objective of our mechanism
design is to elect a node ni with the least cost analysis value (Csti)
as a cluster leader. Since Csti ∝ 1/Ei, electing node with least cost
analysis value is equivalent to electing a node with highest energy
level. We refer to this objective as a Social Choice Function (SCF)
and is deﬁned as:
SCF Min W O i Ni i i i= ( )( ) ={ }−θ θ θ, , , , .,1 2… (2)
If two or more nodes in the cluster have the same cost analysis
value, then the node having the highest reputation among themwill
be elected as the cluster leader by the SCF. Payment in the form of
reputation is made to the elected leader node using a VCG mech-
anism [24]. The amount of service provided by the elected leader
node to any given node nk is proportional to its reputation (Rk). The
payment Pi received by the leader node ni in the form of reputation
(Ri) is equal to the second least cost analysis value Cj excluding
the cost analysis value of the leader node ni and is given by Equa-
tion (3).
P R Min W O j ii i j j j j= = ( )( ≠{ }−θ θ θ, , (3)
We model MANET as a set of clusters as shown in Fig. 3. Based
on the cost analysis value of different nodes, the leader election
mechanism computes the SCF in a distributedmanner which ensures
that all nodes in the cluster elects the same leader. Algorithm 1 il-
lustrates our proposed distributed leader election algorithm in a
MANET cluster. Initially, a random node ni initiates the election
process by sending a Begin_Election message to all the other nodes
in the cluster. The Begin_Election message contains the hash value
H() corresponding to Electionmessage to be sent by the leader node
ni later on. The receiving nodes use this hash value to authenticate
and verify the Election messages received from node ni. The time
T1 speciﬁes the duration of the election process. All the participat-
ing nodes should interchange the Begin_Election messages within
time T1 after the node ni has started the election process. Those nodes
that do not participate in the exchange of Begin_Election messages
are excluded from cluster’s services.
After the completion of exchanges of Begin_Electionmessages the
node ni broadcasts the Election message containing its identity IDni ,
its cost analysis value (Csti), and the time stamp TSi to other nodes
in its cluster. The receiver nodes then verify that the Electionmessage
indeed came from node ni by generating a hash value H*() of the
received Election message. This generated hash value is then com-
pared with the hash value H() received in Begin_Election message
earlier. Upon successful veriﬁcation, each node in the cluster com-
putes the SCF, which is the least cost analysis value as deﬁned in
Equation (2).
After the completion of exchanges of Begin_Election messages
between the nodes, if the elected leader node as per the SCF is dif-
ferent from node ni, then the node ni sends an Elected message to
the chosen leader node. The elected leader node on receiving the
Elected message sends back the Conﬁrmation message to node ni.
The node ni then calculates the payment Payment( RLeaderIDS ) for leader
node using the VCG mechanism as described in Equation (3). The
node ni increases the reputation of the elected leader node ( LeaderIDS)
by value Payment( RLeaderIDS ) in its reputation table. However, if the
node ni ﬁnds itself to be the elected leader after calculating the
SCF, then it sets the timer T2 and starts verifying all the Elected
messages from other nodes. If the timer T2 expires without receiv-
ing Elected messages from all the nodes, then those nodes that
did not participate in the leader election process are debarred from
cluster’s services. The node ni then sends the Conﬁrmation mes-
sages back to the nodes fromwhich it received the Electedmessages.
Upon receiving the Conﬁrmation message, other cluster nodes
calculate the payment for node ni and update their reputation
tables.
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The election process is repeated after every Telect time interval.
If the cluster has not changed after the time interval Telect , then the
cluster formation step is skipped and only the leader election process
is carried out. Re-election is also conducted when the elected leader
node quits the cluster before the completion of Telect time interval.
We illustrate the proposed leader election scheme with an
example as shown in Table 3. The reputations of different nodes at
ith round are shown in the 1st row of table with node N1 elected as
a leader node. The 2nd row gives the energy level of different nodes
at the ith round. The leader node’s sampling budget for different
nodes (in terms of percentage) is shown in the 3rd row.
The election of new leader node for the i th+( )1 round involves
every node to compute its corresponding cost analysis value Csti as


































For Table 3 the value of N is 6. The values of λ and Ti are assumed
to be 0.1 and 10, respectively. Similarly, the energy required for
operating the IDS is assumed to be 0.2 units. Since node N6 has the
least cost analysis value (0.09), it is elected as a new leader node.
Nodes then calculate the payment for the new elected nodeN6, which
is equal to the 2nd least cost analysis value i.e., Pi = 0.1 unit. All the
nodes increase the reputation of the elected node N6 by 0.1. The new
reputations of different nodes at i th+( )1 round are shown in the
5th row. The payoff utility of node N6 calculated using Equation (1)
is 0.1 − 0.09 = 0.01, which represents the beneﬁt gained by the
node N6.
3.2.1. Mechanism analysis
The primary objective of our mechanism design is to encour-
age players (nodes) into truthfully revealing their private information
by providing them incentives for doing so. In this section, we val-
idate our mechanism design to ensure that our proposed model
meets the cost-eﬃciency and truthfulness properties even in the
presence of malicious and selﬁsh nodes in the cluster. This is vali-
dated by demonstrating that truth-telling is the dominant strategy
of our mechanism.
We consider two untruthful revelations of selﬁsh node ni viz.
under-declaration and over-declaration of its cost analysis value Csti,
and show that in both cases it is never better off compared to when
it truthfully reveals its cost analysis value.
Node ni may under-declare its cost analysis value by revealing
a false value Wi* , where W Wi i* < . By declaring a false cheaper
cost analysis value, node ni wins the cluster leader election. However,
under-declaring its cost analysis value will not beneﬁt the node ni
for the following two reasons. In the 1st case, if the real cost
analysis value Wi of the node is already least among all the nodes,
then under-valuing its cost analysis value to Wi* does not in-
crease its payment, since payments are made on the basis of
second least cost analysis value. Therefore, its utility function Ui
remains unchanged since it is calculated with respect to its real
cost analysis value Wi. On the other hand, if the node ni does not
have the least cost analysis value but wins the election by declar-
ing a fake under-valued cost analysis value Wi* then it leads to
negative utility function Ui. This is because the payment Pi re-
ceived by node ni is less than the real cost analysis value Wi.
Therefore, in this case, the work done by node ni exceeds the
amount of payment Pi that it receives.
Similarly, in case of over-declaration, if a node ni over-declares
its cost analysis value by declaring a fake Wi*, where W Wi i* > , then
such a strategy would never increase the payoff utility Ui for the fol-
lowing two reasons. First, if node ni indeed has the least cost analysis
value Wi, then pursuing this strategy leads to node ni not being
elected as the leader node and hence it loses the payment. Second,
Fig. 3. MANET topology with leader IDS.
Table 3
Leader IDS election example.
Nodes N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6
ith round reputation 7 9 2 4 5 3
ith round energy 5 6 4 5 10 7
ith round sampling (%) 23.33 30 6.66 13.33 16.66 10
ith round cost valuation (Csti) 0.28 0.30 0.1 0.16 0.1 0.09
i th+( )1 round reputation 7 9 2 4 5 3.1
i th+( )1 round energy 5 6 4 5 10 6.8
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if the real cost analysis value Wi of node ni is not the least among
all the nodes, then this strategywould never increase its payoff utility
Ui as the node ni would not be chosen as a leader node.
3.2.2. Cooperative catch and punish model
The leader node may misbehave after being elected. Therefore,
we need a mechanism to detect misbehaving leader node and take
appropriate measures. A leader node is said to be misbehaving if
it does not provide intrusion detection services to cluster nodes pro-
portional to their reputations. Checker nodes are employed to
monitor the misbehaving leader node. The checker nodes perform
a small part of the computation executed by the leader node to de-
termine the misbehavior of the leader node. Let Chkcost be the cost
incurred by any given checker to monitor the leader node for elected
period of time. Incentives in the form of checker reputation pay-
ments Pchk are provided to the checker nodes for monitoring the
leader node such that P Chkchk cost− > 0.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the proposed mechanism for election of
checker nodes. Initially, k nodes in the cluster with least cost anal-
ysis Csti excluding the leader node are chosen as checkers. Each node
ni in a cluster then veriﬁes whether it is one of the k checkers. If it
is not a checker then it sends a Chkele message to all the k check-
ers to inform them that they have been elected as a checker. The k
checkers then send back a checker conﬁrmation message Chkconf to
node ni. Upon receiving the conﬁrmationmessages from the checker,
the node ni increments the reputation of the k checker nodes in its
reputation table by Pchk reputation units. After time interval T2, if
the checker node ni has not yet received a Chkele message from any
of the non-checker nodes then it sends Chkconf messages to all the
non-checker nodes from which it has not yet received the Chkele
message. Upon receiving the Chkconf message from the checker node
ni, the non-checker node nj veriﬁes that the Chkconf message indeed
came from one of the checkers by referring to its cost analysis table.
Upon successful veriﬁcation, the receiver node updates its reputa-
tion table by incrementing the reputation of checker node by Pchk
reputation units.
If the leader node ni is found to be misbehaving by the checker
nodes, the mechanism punishes the leader node by lowering its rep-
utation and paying it a negative payment value −pj i.e., the
mechanism instructs all the cluster nodes to decrement the repu-
tation of leader node in their reputation table by value Ri as calculated
in Equation (3). Leader node election is then conducted to elect a
new leader.
To detect a misbehaving leader node, we propose a set of de-
tection level given by DL = {dl1, dl2, . . ., dlj}. The proposed catch and
punish model comprises j detection-levels with each level repre-
senting the severity of the misbehaving leader node. We deﬁne a
threshold set T = {t1, t2, . . ., t j−1} to categorize the misbehaving de-
tection levels. Setting the threshold value above which the leader
node is considered to be misbehaving is crucial. Setting this thresh-
old value too high increases the false positive (FP) rate wherein even
the sincere leader nodes are penalized whereas setting it too low
increases the false negative (FN) rate wherein the mechanism fails
to catch the misbehaving leader node. Therefore, this value must
be set appropriately so as to balance and maintain a good trade-
off between the FP and the FN rates.
Let Chk Chk Chk Chkset x= ( )1 2, , ,… be the set of checker nodes and
S n n nset a b x= ( ), , ,… be the set of nodes monitored by the checkers
such that Chk Sset set= . Each Chk Chki set∈ monitors one of the nodes
n Sj set∈ . We then deﬁne an aggregate function of checkers as:
T n R f ji
i Chk j Sset set





where Ri is the reputation of the checker node Chki and f(j) is the
catch function deﬁned as the ratio of actual number of data packets
analyzed by the leader node for node nj ( n Sj set∈ ) to the actual sam-
pling budget allocation of node nj as observed by the checker node
Chki. We then classify the detection-levels as follows:
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Grouping the severity of misbehaving leader node into j differ-
ent levels minimizes the FP rate while determining the misbehaving
leader node. The leader node foundmisbehavingwith detection level
(DL) lower than the threshold level ( dlth) is penalized by comput-
ing its payment in negative and temporarily debarring it from cluster
services. This acts as a deterrence and discourages the leader node
from misbehaving. Hence a malicious node has no valid motiva-
tion to become a leader node since it has a high probability of being
caught and punished by checker nodes.
3.3. Hybrid MANET IDS
In section 3.1, we discussed about static Bayesian game where
the player Pj (defender) has a ﬁxed prior belief (po) about the op-
ponent player Pi being malicious. However, determining this prior
belief is usually diﬃcult and depends on the nature of the envi-
ronment the IDS is operating on. Nodes inMANETs are usually energy
constrained and may become less responsive as their energy levels
drain out. In addition, some trustworthy nodes may be compro-
mised over a period of time and made to act maliciously. Taking all
these factors into account, the IDS needs to re-evaluate the mali-
cious beliefs of MANET nodes at regular intervals. In this section,
we extend the static Bayesian game to a multi-stage dynamic Bayes-
ian game, wherein the defender player updates its maliciousness
belief about the opponent player as the game evolves.
In the multi-stage Bayesian game, the game is played repeat-
edly after every time interval tk. However, the payoffs of the game
and the identities of the players remain the same throughout each
iteration of the game. The strategies of players in the dynamic game
depends on the history proﬁle of the game. At any stage tk of the
game, the optimal strategy of the attacker player Pi depends on the
maliciousness belief of the defender player Pj about Pi. The defend-
er player Pj’s initial belief about player Pi being malicious at the ﬁrst
stage (t0) of the game is given by the prior probability po. The de-
fender player Pj then updates its malicious belief about the opponent
player Pi at the kth stage of the game by evaluating its posterior belief
pj(θi|ai(tk), ai( tk−1)), where ai(tk) and ai( tk−1) represent the actions taken
by the player Pi at the kth and k
th
−( )1 stage of the game. The player
Pj evaluates its posterior belief about player Pi using the following
Bayes’ rule.
p a t a t
p a t P a t a t
p
j i i k i k
j i i k i k i i k
j
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where P(ai(tk)|θi, ai( tk−1)) is the probability that the player Pi plays
the action ai(tk) at the kth stage, given the type of player Pi is θi and
its action at the k th−( )1 stage was ai( tk−1).
From Equation (5), it can be observed that the defender player
needs to continuously monitor the opponent player at every game
stage to update its belief. However, operating IDS in an always-on
promiscuous mode is not an energy-eﬃcient monitoring strategy.
Therefore, to minimize the energy spent on operating the IDS, we
propose a two layered hybrid IDS detection model. The proposed
hybrid model consists of one lightweight module and one heavy-
weight module. The former module is less powerful but requires
less energy for its operation, while the latter module is more pow-
erful but requires more energy to operate. By default, only the
lightweight module is activated.
In Fig. 1, we have shown the proposed two layered hybrid IDS
framework. Themalicious belief of node ni is updated using the input
from the lightweight IDS module and the history proﬁle of ni’s
actions. The lightweight module calculates two parameters of ni viz.
its packet reception rate (PRR) and the packet forwarding rate (PFR).
(However, in Fig. 1 only the PFR calculation is shown.) The details
about these parameters are discussed in section 3.3.2. The light-
weight IDS module updates the malicious belief of ni using the
observed behavior of ni in the current and previous stage of the game
by employing the Bayes rule. If the PRR or PFR values of ni exceeds
or falls below the threshold value, then the action of ni is assumed
to be attack and the heavyweight module is activated in the next
stage of the game formore rigorous analysis. Themaliciousness value
of ni can be unilaterally reset to a lower value by the heavyweight
IDS module if ni has not acted maliciously for a pre-deﬁned period
of time. After the maliciousness value of ni is reset to lower value,
the heavyweight IDS module is turned off and the lightweight IDS
module is turned on. This process is repeated over the period of time
and only one of the IDS module is activated at any given time.
3.3.1. Heavyweight intrusion detection system (HIDS)
The HIDS uses an unsupervised association-rule mining tech-
nique [45,46] on a set of packet-level transmission events to ﬁnd
the association patterns. The extracted association rules are then
used to build the normal proﬁle of the network. There is a trade-
off between effectiveness and eﬃciency while selecting the feature
set for IDS analysis. A higher number of features can help the IDS
to detect various types of attacks; however, it also results in a higher
power consumption and computational overhead. Considering the
energy constrained MANET nodes, we select a minimum number
of features for developing HIDS normal proﬁle. The transmission
events consist of features listed in Table 4 that are extracted from
the MAC and network layer at a pre-deﬁned sampling rate. A brief
description about each of these features is provided below:
• Packet event type: This feature represents the type of the trans-
mission event taking place.
• Sender Address: This feature represents the MAC address of the
sender node.
• Destination Address: This feature represents the MAC address of
the destination node.
• MACFrameType: This feature represents the type of MAC frame
observed in the transmission event.
• RoutPktType: This feature represents routing control packets
(routingCtrlPkt) like Route Request, Route Reply, Route Error etc.
and data packets (routingDataPkt) from network layer.
• Route change percentage: It is deﬁned as (|S2 − S1| + |S1 − S2|)/|S1|),
where (S2 − S1) indicates the newly increased routing entries and
(S1 − S2) indicates the deleted routing entries during the time in-
terval (t2 − t1).
The HIDS uses multiple segments of training data set to extract
the association rules. These rules are then aggregated to build the
normal proﬁle. The association rule describes the association of at-
tributes within transaction records of an audit data set. Let T = {T1,
T2, . . ., Tn} be the set of n transaction records and F = {F1, F2, . . ., Fk}
be a k feature set deﬁned over T. A transaction record Ti is a col-
lection of k-tuple features i.e., Ti = {f1, f2, . . ., fk}, where fk represents
a value from the kth feature Fk.
Let A and B denote two disjointed item subsets in Ti. The support
of item subset A denoted by sup(A) represents the percentage of
transactions containing A in T and the support of A and B denoted
by sup A B∪( ) represents the percentage of transactions contain-
ing both A and B. The association rule between A and B is given as
A B s c⇒ ( ), , , where s sup A B= ∪( ) and c sup A Bsup A= ∪( )( ) are deﬁned as the
support value and conﬁdence value of the association rule, respec-
tively. The rule holds good if s ≥ minsup and c ≥ minconf, whereminsup
andminconf denote the predeﬁnedminimum support threshold and
minimum conﬁdence threshold values, respectively.
Apriori algorithm [45]was used to build the association rules for the
normal proﬁle. The algorithm mines the frequent itemsets from the
transactional dataset and uses an iterative approach to ﬁnd itemsets
of larger size at each iteration. The algorithm works on the principle
that any subset of a frequent itemset must also be a frequent itemset.
Therefore, the algorithm reduces the number of item candidates being
considered by only exploring the itemsets whose support count is
greater than theminimumsupport count. For our analysis,wehaveused
minsup and minconf values as 15% and 70%, respectively.
A transaction record is a packet level event with the following
format Event SA DA MACFrameType RoutPktType, , , , . An example as-
sociation rule is (SrcMAC6, routingCtrlPkt → DestMAC15 , RECV),(0.35,1),
which describes an event pattern related to the RECV ﬂows of the
monitoring node i.e., 35% of transaction records match the event
of “node 6 sends data packets to node 15”, and when node 15 re-
ceives data packets, they are 100% of the time from node 6. Another
example is (SrcMAC3, routingCtrlPkt → DestMAC7, PCR),(0.20,0.80),
which indicates that route change between node 3 and node 7 con-
stitutes 20% of total route change in the network, and 80% of changes
in node 7’s route is related with change in node 3’s route.
The association rules extracted from the test data (real time data)
are then correlated with the normal proﬁle and any deviation of
the test association rules from the normal proﬁle is considered as
an anomaly by the HIDS.
3.3.2. Lightweight intrusion detection system (LIDS)
It is not eﬃcient to operate the association-rule based HIDS in an
always-on mode since it uses massive packet-level transmissions of
network andMAC layers to detect intrusions. Therefore, we propose
an alternative lightweight monitoring system (LIDS) to update the
malicious belief of the defender node about the opponent node ni
on every stage of the game. The LIDS being a lightweightmodule uses
simple rules and methods to detect intrusions. It uses two different
approaches for detecting the inbound and outbound attacks. The fol-
lowing inbound attacks are considered in our study: Sleep deprivation,
Flooding, DoS and Forging attack. The outbound attacks considered
are Black hole attack and packet dropping attack. Let Nj represent the




Packet event type (Event) SEND, RECV, DROP, FWD
Sender Address (SA) SrcMACi
Destination Address (DA) DestMACi
MACFrameType RTS, CTS, DATA, ACK
RoutPktType routingCtrlPkt, routingDataPkt
Route change percentage PCR
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attacker node Pi ∈ Nj. Let R tji k( ) denote the number of data packets
received by node Pj from node Pi during the game stage tk.
We deﬁne the following two terminologies to determine the out-
bound and inbound attacks: Packet Reception Rate (PRR) and Packet
Forwarding Rate (PFR). The PRR of node Pj from node Pi for game
stage tk is deﬁned as the rate of inbound data traﬃc from node Pi
to node Pj with respect to the total data traﬃc rate in the vicinity
of node Pj. It is given as:










R t R t
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j j
( ) = ( )( ) + ( )∈∈≠ ∈∑ (6)
If the value of PRR is greater than the threshold value τ, the action
of the player Pi is assumed to be an inbound attack. Therefore, the
action of node Pi i.e., ai(tk) = inbound attack, if φ τji kt( ) > .
The PFR of node Pi for game stage tk is deﬁned as the ratio of
number of packets received by the node Pi from its neighboring nodes
to the number of packets forwarded by node Pi to its neighboring
nodes (Ni) and is given by:















The action of node Pi is implied to be an outbound attack if the
value of ψi(tk) is less than the threshold value Θ. In other words,
the action of node Pi i.e., ai(tk) = outbound attack if ψi(tk) < Θ.
The choices of PRR and PFR threshold values τ and Θ inﬂuence
the performance of the LIDS. These threshold values can be calcu-
lated experimentally from the normal data traﬃc patterns. Employing
this simple analysis rule of LIDS as a precursor before applying the
association-rules of the HIDS can signiﬁcantly lower the FP rate of
the overall IDS.
Let the detection rate and FP rate of LIDS be αL and γL, respec-
tively. Let P(ai(tk)|θi, ai( tk−1)) be the conditional probability of player
Pi playing action ai(tk) at kth stage of game, given its type θi and its
action at the k th−( )1 stage was ai( tk−1). This conditional probability
can be updated as follows:
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P a t Attack a ti k i i k L( )( = = ( )) =−θ γ0 1, (10)
P a t Not Attack a ti k i i k L( )( = = ( )) = −−θ γ0 11, (11)
In above equations, p represents the probability of the mali-
cious player Pi to play its strategy Attack under Nash Equilibrium
(NE). Similarly, (1 − αL) and (1 − γL) represent the false negative (FN)
rate and the true negative (TN) rate of the LIDS, respectively. The
LIDS can determine the action of the node Pi using Equation (6) and
Equation (7). It then updates the maliciousness value of the player
Pi using Equation (5) along with Equation (8) through Equation (11).
3.4. Numerical Example
Continuing with our standard notation, let α and γ be the de-
tection rate and FP rate of the heavyweight IDS, respectively.
Similarly, let αL and γL be the detection rate and FP rate of the light-
weight IDS, respectively. Consider a defender attacker game
interacting over a node nk. Let Cmk and Cak be the cost associated
with monitoring and attacking node nk. Let the asset value of nk be
wk. In previous sections, we have developed the BNE of the game,
which corresponds to the strategy combination (p*, q*, p(θi)), where
p w Cw p
k mk
k i
* = ++( ) ( )
γ






* = −2α is the monitoring probability of the defender player
Pj and p(θi) is the maliciousness belief of Pj about Pi, which is given
by Equation (5). Consider a heavyweight and a lightweight module
with the following values, α = 0.9178, γ = 0.0025, αL = 0.833 and
γL = 0.0029. Let wk = 9.45 and C C wa m kk k= = 1000. Assume that the
initial belief of Pj about Pi being malicious is 0.5, i.e. initial value of
p(θi) = 0.5. Therefore, the probability of player Pi playing its strat-
egy attack for the 1st stage of the game is p p i* = = =( )
0 0019 0 0019
0 5 0 0038. . . .θ .
Similarly, the monitoring probability q* = 0.5442. Next, we update
the malicious belief of player Pi under following conditions:
Case 1: The observed action of Pi by the lightweight module of
Pj is Attack:
p t
p t P a t Attack a t
p t
i


















Case 2: The observed action of Pi by the lightweight module of
Pj is Not Attack:
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From the above results, it can be observed that when the action
of Pi is detected as an Attack by Pj (defender) then the malicious-
ness belief of Pj about Pi increases, which in turn decreases the
probability of Pi to play its strategy Attack in the next game stage. On
the other hand, when the action of Pi is detected as Not Attack by Pj,
then Pj’s malicious belief about Pi decreases, which increases the prob-
ability of Pi to play its strategy Attack in the next stage of the game.
It can also be observed that the proposed hybrid MANET IDS reduces
the power consumption by activating the heavyweight IDS module
54.42% of the time instead of turning it on 100% of the time.
Summarizing the above results and discussion, we conclude that
themonitoring probability of the Pj does not depend on its currentma-
liciousness belief about Pi, but rather inﬂuences the Pi’s behavior. A high
maliciousness belief results in Pi drastically reducing its attack. This is
result of the fact that both Pi and Pj are rational players, and the cost
andmaliciousness beliefs are common knowledge for both the players.
4. Experimental results
Since our work comprises two different components, we clas-
sify our analysis into following two subsections:
• Analysis of MANET leader election mechanism.
• Analysis of the hybrid MANET IDS.
1. Evaluate the detection rate and the FP rates of the light-
weight module and the heavyweight module of the proposed
hybrid MANET IDS.
2. Evaluate the payoff utilities of the attacker and defender nodes
under different BNE strategies.
3. Analysis of reduction in IDS traﬃc generation achieved by the
proposed MANET IDS scheme.
4. Performance analysis comparison of the proposedMANET IDS
scheme with other well known schemes.
We have implemented our proposed model in the network simu-
lator NS2 [25] on Ubuntu 12.04 running gcc version 4.6.3. We restrict
the movements of the mobile nodes to a predeﬁned ﬂat-grid area of
15 × 15m2. Table 5 lists the various parameters used in our simulation.
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4.1. MANET leader election mechanism analysis
We analyze our proposed model to study the impact of our
scheme (leader IDS election) on the average life span of nodes. Ini-
tially, nodes in the cluster are assigned energy levels between 5 and
50 Joules. The energy consumed by the leader IDS for elected period
of time (15 s) is assumed to be 4 Joules. The energy required by nodes
for their normal operations and transmissions has been ignored to
simplify the analysis.
We analyze our proposed model in a cluster consisting of 12
nodes, with 25% i.e., 3 malicious nodes. Figs. 4 and 5 show the energy
levels of different nodes using the random leader election model
and the VCG leader election model, respectively. It can be ob-
served that in the random model some of the nodes die out over a
period of time, while the energy levels of other nodes remain con-
stant or decreasemarginally. On the other hand, the VCGmechanism
based leader election model balances the energy levels of all nodes
by always electing the most cost-eﬃcient node (high-energy level
node) as cluster leader. In general, it was found that the proposed
leader election model increases the average lifetime of the cluster
node by 15–20% compared to a randommodel that does not employ
leader election mechanism.
Fig. 6 shows the percentage of normal alive nodes versus per-
centage of malicious nodes in a cluster consisting of 20 nodes after
2400 s. A malicious node avoids being elected as a leader node by
exaggerating its cost analysis value. It can be observed from the ﬁgure that as the number of malicious node increases in the network, the
number of alive normal nodes decreases. This shows that the normal
nodes carry out more intrusion detection services and die out faster
as the number of selﬁsh nodes increase in the cluster.
4.2. Hybrid MANET IDS analysis
For analyzing the proposed hybrid MANET IDS, the Packet Re-
ception Rate (PRR) threshold (τ) and Packet Forwarding Rate (PFR)
threshold (Θ) values of the lightweight module are taken as 0.5 and
0.3, respectively. The observed detection rate (αL) and false posi-
tive rate (γL) of the lightweight module against different types of
attacks like DoS, Packet dropping, Packet distortion, Route compro-
mise, Black-hole etc. using the above (PRR) and (PFR) threshold values
were found to be 81.33% and 0.61%, respectively.
The features listed in Table 4 are used to build the association
rules for the heavyweight IDSmodule. We considered different sam-
pling intervals for creating a training dataset, with each training
instance containing a summary statistics of network activities for
the speciﬁed time interval. The values of minimum support thresh-
old (minsup) andminimum conﬁdence threshold (minconf) are taken
as 15% and 65%, respectively.
The performance analysis of association-rule basedHIDS is carried
out under different traﬃc conditions and against different types of
Table 5
Parameters used for simulation.
Parameters Value
Simulation time 900–3000 s
Number of nodes 12–30
Simulation area 600 × 600 m2
Transmission range 150 m
Mobility Random way point
Routing protocol DSR
MAC layer DCF of IEEE 802.11
Max. node movement speed 20 m/s
Pause time 500 s
Traﬃc type CBR/UDP
Election period 60 s
Data rate 20k bps
Packet size 512 Bytes
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11b
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Fig. 6. Percentage of normal alive nodes versus percentage of malicious nodes.
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attacks. Two different test scripts are used to generate training traces.
8k Trace and 5k Trace are normal training traces without any in-
trusions and with running time of 8000 s and 5000 s, respectively.
The sampling rate of 3 s is used to record the feature values. The
association rules extracted from these traces are then used to build
the normal proﬁle of the network.
Larger test traces with execution time from 10,000 (10k) seconds
to 15,000 (15k) seconds were then generated. The association rules
extracted from the test data (real-time monitoring data) were then
compared against the normal proﬁle. Any deviation of test associa-
tion rules from the normal proﬁle are considered as an anomaly, which
triggers an intrusion alert. These test traces contain various types of
attacks like Route compromise, Traﬃc distortion and Black-hole attacks.
A brief description of these attack types is provided below:
• Route compromise: This type of attack involves either forward-
ing a packet to an incorrect node or propagating false route
updates.
• Traﬃc distortion: These attacks change the normal traﬃc behav-
ior by randomly dropping packets, generating packets with faked
source address, reporting false misbehavior against normal node,
corrupting the packet contents and denial of service.
• Black-hole attack: In this attack, a malicious node advertises spu-
rious routing information, thus receiving packets and dropping
them instead of forwarding them.
Table 6 shows the performance of the proposed unsupervised
association-rule based HIDS against different types of attacks. It can
be seen that the HIDS effectively detects the simulated attacks with
relatively low FP rate. Table 7 shows the detection rate and FP rate
of the HIDS on the test traces. The average detection rate and false
alarm rate of the HIDS on these test traces are 91.78% and 0.5%,
respectively.
Fig. 7 shows the defender’s payoff playing its pure strategies
Monitor and Not Monitor when the defender’s maliciousness belief
about opponent player is less than the malicious threshold ( pth),
i.e., p po th< . It can be observed from the ﬁgure that the defender
is always better of playing its pure strategyNot Monitorwhen p po th< .
The game under consideration is strictly non-cooperative. There-
fore, each player tries tominimize the opponent’s payoff. Fig. 8 shows
the attacker’s payoff corresponding to two different pure strate-
gies of the defender. Similarly, Fig. 9 shows the defender’s payoff
corresponding to two different pure strategies of the attacker. It can
be observed from these ﬁgures that the payoff of the opponent player
increases when the player deviates from its BNE strategy. Fig. 10
shows the attacker’s payoff under static and dynamic Bayesian games.
It can be observed from the ﬁgure that in the static Bayesian game,
the attacker gets a higher payoff.
Table 6
Performance of association-rule based heavyweight IDS for different classes of attacks.
Attack Type Detection rate False alarm rate
Route compromise 91.4% 0.45%
Traﬃc distortion 95.3% 0.87%
Black-hole 99.5% 0.35%
Table 7
Performance of association-rule based heavyweight IDS.
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Fig. 9. Defender’s Payoff corresponding to different strategies of Attacker.
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4.2.1. Comparison of proposed MANET IDS scheme with other
methods
We have evaluated the performance of our proposed hybrid
MANET IDS scheme with various other models like SRPDBG [47],
CrossLayer [48], SPF [49], Watchdog [32], TWOACK [17] and EAACK
[18]. These models were chosen for comparison since they repre-
sent a spectrum of MANET IDS schemes based on game theory
(SRPDBG), data mining (CrossLayer), speciﬁcation (SPF) and rules
(Watchdog, TWOACK and EAACK). The following metrics were used
for evaluation of the proposed hybridMANET IDS schemewith other
IDS schemes:
• Packet delivery ratio (PDR) refers to the ratio of the number of
packets delivered to the destination node against the number
of packets generated by the source node.
• Routing overhead (RO) refers to the overhead involved in trans-
mission due to introduction of additional routing control packets
like Route Request (RREQ), Route Reply (RREP), Route Error
(RERR), ACK etc.
Figs. 11 and 12 show the PDR and RO of the various IDS schemes
under varying percentage of malicious nodes. It can be observed
from these ﬁgures that all the four schemes (TWOACK, EAACK,
SRPDBG and proposed IDS) have higher PDR than the simple
WatchDog scheme. The PDR of our proposed IDS scheme is com-
parable to that of EAACK and CrossLayer schemes, while it
outperforms the TWOACK and SRPDBG schemes. On the other hand,
the Watchdog scheme has the least RO, as it does not use any ac-
knowledgment scheme to detect misbehaving nodes. The RO of the
proposed IDS is less than the TWOACK, EAACK and CrossLayer
schemes but higher than the SRPDBG scheme. The RO of the pro-
posed IDS scheme is primarily due to exchanges of electionmessages
for electing the MANET leader node and checker nodes.
Table 8 shows the detection rate and false alarm rate of various
IDS models on different classes of attacks. It can be observed from
the table that our proposed HYB_IDS achieves high detection rate
against all categories of attacks while producing a minimal amount
of false alarms. The performance analysis comparison of various IDS
models has been provided in Table 9.
From Tables 8 and 9, it can be summarized that the proposed
hybrid scheme achieves high detection rate against different classes
of attacks, while at the same time minimizes the overall false alarm
rate and the computational overhead required for operating the IDS.
However, the drawback of the proposed scheme is that it incurs a
marginal overhead due to its cluster leader election process.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a new IDS scheme for MANETs which



















































































Fig. 12. Routing Overhead.
Table 8
Performance comparison of various IDS models.
IDS Models Attack Type Detection Rate False Alarm rate
SPF Route Compromise 47.56% 0.57%
Traﬃc Distortion 43.24% 0.49%
Black Hole 81.23% 0.51%
CrossLayer Route Compromise 92.36% 0.38%
Traﬃc Distortion 97.33% 0.93%
Black Hole 99.7% 0.53%
SRPDGB Route Compromise 65.43% 0.36%
Traﬃc Distortion 51.56% 0.55%
Black Hole 99.42% 0.37%
HYB_IDS Route Compromise 91.4% 0.45%
Traﬃc Distortion 95.3% 0.87%
Black Hole 99.5% 0.35%
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IDS. The main contributions of our proposed hybrid IDS scheme to
the ﬁeld of intrusion detection in MANETs is development of an IDS
model that minimizes the power consumption and achieves a high
detection rate across a wide range of attacks along with reduced
false alarm rate. The proposed scheme minimizes the power con-
sumption required for operating the IDS in MANETs through
distribution of intrusion detection task among various nodes by em-
ploying a VCGmechanism based cluster leader election process. On
the other hand, high detection rate and reduced false alarm rate are
achieved by the hybrid IDS which comprises a threshold based
lightweight module and a powerful anomaly based heavyweight
module.
Our future work will be focused on improving the detection rate
and decreasing the false positive rate of both the lightweight and
the heavyweight modules of the hybrid MANET IDS. At present, the
detection rate of the lightweight and the heavyweight modules are
91.78% and 81.33%, respectively. We also plan to investigate appli-
cation of other equilibrium concepts like Pareto Equilibrium,
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and Correlated Equilibrium in
our future work. The reﬁnement of theMANET leader electionmech-
anism to address various issues like identiﬁcation of selﬁsh nodes
in MANETs with greater accuracy, minimizing the computational
overhead involved in execution of cluster leader node electionmech-
anism, etc. are other possible potential research directions.
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